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DOES OBJECTIVES-BASED FINANCIAL REGULATION IMPLY A
RETHINK OF LEGISLATIVELY MANDATED ECONOMIC REGULATION?
A LITERATURE REVIEW
Bryane Michael*, Say-Hak Goo**, and Svitlana Osaulenko***
Objectives-based legislation—or laws that focus on achieving particular and
concrete outcomes—has become a new and important tool that financial sector
regulators use to tackle large and varied financial system risks. Yet, objectivesbased legislation—and the frequent principles-based regulation underpinned by
such legislation—represents a stark departure from traditional ways of legislating.
In this paper, we describe the problems and prospects of implementing objectivesbased financial regulation—in the form of a Twin Peaks regulatory structure. A
focus on the objectives of achieving financial market stability and proper market
conduct would require a different approach to legislating and regulating in most
other countries.
INTRODUCTION
A revolution has been occurring in all kinds of government contracting since
the mid-1980s. Government bodies have been increasing use of performance-based
contracts, results-based budgeting, and outcomes-based performance management
as ways to focus on regulatory outcomes rather than processes. Nowhere has the
trend toward outcomes-based regulation been more pronounced than in financial
sector regulation. Bank regulators (like the U.K.’s Prudential Regulation Authority)
focus on risks to the U.K.’s financial markets, whether they come from banks,
broker-dealers, or insurance companies. The U.K.’s Financial Services Act of 2012
looks very different from previous acts in other countries. The Act defines general
objectives of the Authority—rather than describing the mechanics of how such an
Authority would work. Such a legislative approach represents a watershed change
in legislative drafting. Imagine if the Crime Act legislatively required a murder rate
below 5 per 1000, and set up law enforcement agencies using statutory instruments
which only defined broad objectives? Such an example shows the important—and
controversial—nature of such objectives-based legislation.
In this paper, we review the literature and data about how objectives-based
legislation provides a new paradigm for thinking about the way governments create
and organize regulatory agencies.1 An objectives-based approach to legislation
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would challenge the fundamentals of legislative and administrative jurisprudence.
Part I reviews what we know about objectives (or results-based) legislative drafting.
We describe theories for thinking about the division, and sharing, of competencies
between regulatory agencies with the aim of tackling particularly large and complex
regulatory challenges. Part II describes Twin Peaks regulation as an objectivesbased regulatory approach—giving examples of such regulation for readers not
particularly well-versed on financial sector regulation. This Part also describes the
objectives and circumstances under which a jurisdiction may choose a Twin Peaks
model. Finally, Part III will conclude with a brief discussion of the appropriateness
of objectives-based legislation more generally.
I. GROPING TOWARD OBJECTIVES-BASED LEGISLATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW
A. LEGISLATING GOVERNMENT BODIES FOCUSING ON PARTICULAR
OUTCOMES
To what extent should legislation define public policy objectives?
Traditionally, legislative acts have focused on defining rights and obligations of
various persons and providing the legal basis for the government bodies that police
the enforcement of these rights and obligations.2 Public policy defines goals, while
legislation and regulation outline the way the government helps achieve these (often
changing) policies.3 Legislation—and regulation based on that legislation—
represents the method of putting policy priorities into practice.4 Traditionally,
legislation designates one administrative body to deal with a specific social
problem—the police deal with local law enforcement, the health ministry deals with
hospitals, and so forth. Yet, many scholars have noticed a significant rethink of the
traditional role of legislation. Increasingly complex social problems have required

1 This paper provides the background for a larger study looking at the appropriateness of objective-based
Twin Peaks financial regulation in and for Hong Kong. For that larger study, see Bryane Michael et al., Does
Objectives-Based Financial Regulation Imply a Rethink of Legislatively Mandated Economic Regulation?, 15
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 115 (2020) (for the first half), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523346.
2 We do not have the space to describe the extent to which legislative drafters define the intent of a
particular bill from the text of the document itself or the way that legislators choose the ambiguity or
specificity of particular black letter statutory provisions. The “canonical” view of legislation focuses on law as
transmitting legislators’ desire for some outcome into the creation of rights and obligations and instructions to
executive agencies for enforcing/supervising those rights and obligations. For a recent discussion of the
issues, see generally John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005).
3 The process, of course, is far more complex than this. In practice, administrative agencies have great
latitude in determining legislative intent—and administrative and other courts have latitude in questioning a
regulator’s interpretation of a statute’s objectives. For a recent discussion of some of these issues, see
generally Daniel Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent,
Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783 (2007).
4 The line between legislation and regulation has become increasingly blurry—with administrative
agencies often given extremely wide latitude to make laws. See generally Peter Shane, Separation of Powers
in American Constitutionalism: The Twenty-Eighth Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on
Law and Public Policy—2009: IV. The Administrative State and the Constitution: Legislative Delegation, the
Unitary Executive, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2010).
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organizational structures that involve overlapping competencies, inter-agency
cooperation, and a focus on the outcomes (rather than process) of executive action.5
New approaches to public agency organizational design focus on methods of
inter-agency cooperation and outcomes rather than processes. Figure 1 shows the
major research areas that have grappled with these issues in recent years. The
“quality of legislation school” focuses on the mechanics of writing laws—arguing
that the clarity of drafting and public participation in such drafting can affect
implementation (and thus the laws’ effectiveness).6 According to this mechanistic
approach to assigning agency competencies, large social problems can be tackled by
allocating competencies rationally among existing agencies or by creating a new
agency. According to this approach, if a regulatory agency does not deal adequately
with complex issues (like financial crises), better legal drafting can solve the
problem. The “administrative discretion school” might argue that, with loosely
defined legislation and regulation, administrative agencies can adopt their own rules
to respond to complex social issues.7 Unlike the “quality of legislation school”, this
school of authors argues that murkier (less clear) legal drafting provides the best
way of allowing regulatory agencies to deal with complex social issues. Because
public policy objectives change over time, regulatory discretion provides executive
agencies with the latitude they need to respond to an increasingly complex
regulatory environment.8 Regulatory interpretation is an ongoing process of
matching regulations with agency needs to address the problems of society.9 For
both these schools, sufficiently clearly (or unclearly) legislation and rulemaking can
resolve any problems in assigning competencies between agencies.

5 A variety of scholars have argued that increasingly complex social risks and challenges require a
rethink of the traditional structure of government. For a recent take on this long-standing debate, see Donald
Kettl, Managing Boundaries in American Administration: The Collaboration Imperative, 66 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 10, 12–14 (2006).
6 For a recent example, see Wim Voermans, Concern about the Quality Of EU Legislation: What Kind
Of Problem, By What Kind Of Standards?, 2 ERASMUS L. REV. 1, (2010). See also Helen Xanthaki, The
Problem of Quality in EU Legislation: What on Earth is Really Wrong?, 38 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 651
(2001). See also ANN SEIDMAN, ROBERT SEIDMAN, & NALIN ABEYESEKERE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR
DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (2000).
7 Like with all the “schools” we describe, our caricature descriptions cannot hope to describe all the
complexity of the views espoused by the various authors whose work we cite. For a recent discussion of some
of these issues, see William West, Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging Literature, 65 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 655, 655–58 (2005). For a legal angle, see Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation
and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003).
8 Such an approach has gained proponents among scholars like Stack, who argue that a “purposive
approach, not a textualist one, best suits the distinctive legal character of regulations.” See Kevin Stack,
Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 355 (2012). Even though rule makers originally wrote very
specific regulations, new social and administrative values require new interpretations of even specific
regulations. Given the need to adapt to ever-changing values and needs, the reader might ask, why not just
adopt a more objectives-based approach to interpretation? See id. at 399–400.
9 Andromachi Georgosouli, Regulatory Interpretation: Conversational or Constructive?, 30 OXF. J. OF
LEG. STUD. 1, 2 (2010).
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Figure 1: How to Deal With Complex Social Problems (like Financial
Crises)? A Perspective from Several Branches of Literature
Research area

Description

Critiques

Quality of
legislation
(drafting) school

Focuses on the mechanics of
drafting legislation, focusing
on clarity and consultation.

Administrative
discretion school

Either de jure or de facto
administrative discretion
encourages focus on
important objectives
New, complex challenges—
combined with IT
technologies—allow for
greater scope of interagency collaboration.

Does not deal with the goal of
legislative drafting.
Putting same words in different
legal system can have adverse
consequences.
Does not define which
objectives and subject to abuse
(capacious and arbitrary
regulatory behaviour).
Often based on models and
jargon instead of hard data.
Challenges to inter-agency
coordination often shown to be
greater than benefits of such
collaboration. Why not just
make agencies that focus on
objectives rather than
processes?

Inter-agency
Administrative
Networks in a
Multi-layered
Public
Administrative
School
Inter-agency
Administrative
Law School

“Public Policy
Implementation”
School
PerformanceBased Budgeting

Financial
Regulatory
Reform

Focuses on the legal
rationale for dividing
competencies among
agencies. Also focuses on
the politics behind such a
partition. Ignores analysis
of the actual problems these
agencies try to solve.
Focuses on organisational
conditions for successfully
implementing policies.
Agencies receive resources
to the extent they achieve
particular objectives. Thus,
their existence and size
depends on extent they
achieve objectives.
Objectives allow agencies to
organize themselves in order
to
deal
with
multidisciplinary risks.

Assumes “implementation” of
legislative objectives, despite
most not defined in law.
Objectives can change and
reflect the political priorities of
the day.

Encourages extreme
administrative discretion and
reduces legal certainty.
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The figure summarises some of the recent literature dealing with the size and scope
of executive agencies. We focus on literature dealing with the way that structure
follows strategy—mapping organization to policy challenges.
Authors writing in “inter-agency public administration school” argue that
cross-agency collaborations sometimes represent the best approach to tackling large,
complex regulatory challenges. Often more positive than normative, authors
writing in this school explain why inter-agency collaboration has increased—and if
such inter-agency collaboration represents the best public sector organizational form
for dealing with complex social problems. For example, in Hall and O’Toole’s
study of U.S. legislation between 1965-66 and 1993-94, it was found that interagency work increased over time.10 Roughly eighty-four percent of programs in the
sixties required multi-agency support. By the 1990s, that proportion rose to ninety
percent. Most studies in this school find that “networked” or “joined up” policy
implementation must occur—because the objectives of legislation span beyond the
institutional silos inherited from decades (or centuries) of use.11 Public sector
managers can overcome the inherent difficulties and ambiguities of inter-agency
relationships by “managing for results.”12 Such a solution begs the question—why
not structure administrative agencies around desired outcomes in the first place?13
Rather pointlessly, authors in the “interagency administrative law school” have
looked at legal issues surrounding the design and operation of inter-agency
collaboration. Most authors in this school describe small issues in administrative
law, usually arguing why particular administrative decisions may (or may not)
represent the best outcome for the development of administrative law in general.14
A “shared regulatory space” (usually some form of collective action problem
between agencies) requires action by multiple agencies.15 Some authors argue that
the “best” agency design may not be achievable—as political processes often

10 See Thad Hall & Laurence O’Toole, Structures for Policy Implementation: An Analysis of National
Legislation, 1965-1966 and 1993-1994, 31 ADMIN. & SOC. 667, 682–84 (2000).
11 See Robyn Keast et al., Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations, 64 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 363, 364 (2004). See also Bob Hudson et al., In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration in the
Public Sector: What is the Contribution of Theory and Research?, 1 PUB. MAN REV., 235 (1999). See also
Christopher Pollitt, Joined-up Government: A Survey, 1 POL. STUD. REV. 34, 46–47 (2003).
12 The term ‘managing for results’ represented an important, if vacuous, nostrum—encouraging
administrators to follow the rules, but also achieve results. See Stephen Page, Measuring Accountability for
Results in Interagency Collaboratives, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 591, 591–95 (2004); see also John Bryson,
Barbara Crosby & Melissa Stone, The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations:
Propositions from the Literature, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 44, 48 (2006).
13 Indeed, failures in inter-agency cooperation related to the fight against terrorism and other aspects of
law enforcement have led to a broader disenchantment with inter-agency collaboration. See Ashton Carter,
The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism, 26 INT’L SEC. 5, 7–11 (2002). The failure of interagency cooperation to prevent and quickly resolve the 2007-08 financial crisis further cast doubts about interagency cooperation as an effective method of dealing with large and serious social risks.
14 For an overview of many of the issues and authors, see generally Jason Marisam, Interagency
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013).
15 For a recent take on inter-agency coordination, see Jim Rossi & Jody Freeman, Agency Coordination
in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1161-73 (2012).
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determine the structure of agencies and regulators.16 In general, legal schools have
completely failed to write about how objectives help shape law and the development
of administrative traditions.17
Two seemingly unrelated schools of thought have struggled with ways of
improving the performance of executive agencies when they work in combination
on complex social problems. Unique to public administration, authors in the
“public policy implementation school” look at the extent to which various types of
executive agency design help promote certain policy outcomes.18
Many
commentators point to stupidity (for lack of a better word) by policymakers at all
levels to change government agencies and their processes in order to improve policy
implementation.19 Cooperation between government agencies—and the outcomes
of such collaboration—may improve only when agencies tackle complex tasks.20
Yet, such collaboration needs deliberate design. The “performance-based budgeting
school” argues that rule-makers and executive agency creators need not worry too
much about organizational design—as long as they provide cross-agency incentives
for executive agencies to maximize performance. Budgets should allocate resources
based on social needs, not based on past or requested budgets. For example, a
performance-based budget for tackling HIV/AIDS might allocate funds to the
Ministry of Education, Interior Ministry, local governments, and even Ministry for
Foreign Affairs (if relevant) to the extent their activities can help achieve a set
decrease in new infections.21 Such a strategy basically represents an objectivesbased approach to executive agency design. Budgets set objectives—and agencies
must work in collaboration in order to receive budget line-item funding. However,
such budgeting in such a way does not allow for unpredictability and resource
overruns.22 Moreover, like with inter-agency collaboration, performance-based
budgeting has not necessarily resulted in significant improvements in multiple
agencies’ ability to solve certain social problems.23

16 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1057–
58 (2011).
17 Authors writing in the New Comparative Economics perspective represent a refreshing (yet brief) look
at how economic objectives and incentives shape the development of administrative law and agency design.
For one of the first comprehensive discussions about how incentives drive legal development, see Simeon
Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 34 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 4 (2003).
18 See Jill Schofield, Time for a revival? Public policy implementation: a review of the literature and an
agenda for future research, 3 INT’L J. OF MAN. REV. 245, 246–47 (2001); see also Harald Saetren, Facts and
Myths about Research on Public Policy Implementation: Out-of-Fashion, Allegedly Dead, But Still Very Much
Alive and Relevant, 33 POL’Y. STUD. J. 559 (2005).
19 For an-oldie-but-goodie taking on this issue, see Benjamin Crosby, Policy Implementation: The
Organizational Challenge, 24 WORLD DEV. 9 (1996).
20 See Martin Lundin, When Does Cooperation Improve Public Policy Implementation?, 35 POL. STUD. J.
629, 629 (2007).
21 See Matthew Andrews, Performance-Based Budgeting Reform, ANWAR SHAH, FISCAL MANAGEMENT
(2005).
22 See Matthew Andrews, Authority, Acceptance, Ability and Performance-Based Budgeting Reforms, 17
INT’L J. PUB. SEC. MANAGE. 332, 334 (2004).
23 See generally Jack Yun-Jie Lee & Xiao-Hu Wang, Assessing the Impact of Performance-Based
Budgeting: A Comparative Analysis across the United States, Taiwan, and China, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 60
(2009). For a more general review, see Marc Robinson & James Brumby, Does Performance Budgeting
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Nowhere has the discussion about organizing public administrative agencies
gone further than discussion by the “financial regulatory reform school.”24 The
2008 financial crisis led to wide-spread acceptance that previous regulatory
structures failed to manage risks inherent in the New Financial Architecture of the
2000s.25 The lack of regulatory supervision over the financial sector, and
regulators’ ad hoc response to the crisis showed that existing financial regulatory
agencies either lacked the authority or ability to engage in necessary financial
supervision.26 Naturally, policymakers and academics called for a restructuring of
financial regulators in many financially developed jurisdictions. Both the U.K. and
U.S. came out with Blueprints for reforming financial regulators like the Financial
Services Authority (“FSA”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
respectively.27 Both Blueprints came out in favour of objectives-based regulation
focusing on macro-prudential surveillance and rulemaking, and monitoring of
market conduct.28 Academics reached pretty much the same conclusion.29 Because
the U.K. approach to implementing a Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation
centred around objectives-based legislation, the discussion about Twin Peaks
regulation and objectives-based regulation often go hand-in-hand.
B. TWIN PEAKS REGULATORY SYSTEMS AND OBJECTIVES-BASED
LEGISLATION

Work?: An Analytical Review of the Empirical Literature 17–30 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper 05/210,
2005).
24 For a discussion, see Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for
Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881 (2009).
25 The New Financial Architecture refers to the “globally integrated system of giant bank conglomerates
and the so-called ‘shadow banking system’ of investment banks, hedge funds and bank-created Special
Investment Vehicles” that emerged after financial sector deregulation of the 2000s in the US and EU. See
James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial
Architecture’, 33 CAMB. J. ECON. 563, 564 (2009).
26 Instead of a proper system of supervision and resolution (saving or winding-up financial institutions in
times of crisis), US authorities had to engage in “regulation by deals” in order to put in place micro and macroprudential measures. See Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation By Deal: The Government's Response
To The Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 464 (2009).
27 See generally HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: DRAFT SECONDARY
LEGISLATION (2012),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191571/con
doc_fin_regulation_draft_secondary_leg.pdf; DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
28 To take one example, the “Treasury believes that a regulatory structure centered on an objectivesbased regulatory framework should represent the optimal structure.” DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at
143.
29 Authors like Levine argued for objectives-based legislation creating “an informed, expertly staffed,
and independent institution that evaluates financial regulation from the public’s perspective.” Ross Levine,
The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis, 12 INT’L REV. OF FIN. 1, 12
(2010). Eddy Wymeersch, after considering the range of institutional structures present across Europe, noted
that consolidation of regulators seems to be the trend—with objectives-based approaches often preferred. See
Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors,
Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 2 (2007).
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Creating and organizing regulators to achieve specific objectives represents
one (relatively new) way of regulating a financial sector. Figure 2 shows the major
approaches to financial regulation—broadly describing each approach and showing
several countries following that approach.30 Traditionally, regulators have taken an
institutional or functional approach to financial sector regulation. Banking laws
tended to place the authority to oversee banks with the central bank or a separate
banking regulator. Securities acts world-wide tended to put a securities regulator in
charge of capital markets surveillance.31 By the early 2000s, both policymakers and
academics alike asked if integrating financial sector supervisors could provide
higher risk-adjusted returns to the national financial sector as a whole.32 The trend
toward unifying regulators increased—with more countries merging financial
regulators from sectoral to more integrated structures. Yet, by the time of the 200708 financial crisis, many countries’ lawmakers realized that a single, integrated
regulator probably would not provide the best level of regulatory oversight.33 The
global financial crisis also led to intense debate around objectives-based (rather than
institutions or services-based) regulators. Inspired by both policymaker and
academic support for Twin Peaks financial sector regulation, more countries are
drafting objectives-based legislation putting a Twin Peaks regulatory framework in
place.34

30 See GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 13 (2008), https://group30.org/publications/detail/138.
31 For a historical cross-country overview of countries’ financial sector regulatory choices (including the
extent of integration between these regulators), see Jose de Luna-Martinez and Thomas Rose, International
Survey of Integrated Financial Sector Supervision (The World Bank Fin. Sector Operations and Policy Dep’t,
Working Paper No. 3096, 2003), http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6522027.pdf. We describe their
data in detail in a subsequent section. See infra Part II.
32 See Martin Cihak & Richard Podpiera, Is One Watchdog Better Than Three? International Experience
with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision (IMF, Working Paper 06/57, 2006),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0657.pdf.
33 Many countries’ changes in financial regulation had the U.K.’s experience well in mind. The failure
of the U.K.’s integrated FSA, which inspired other countries to adopt such an approach, led to a groping
around for “something better.” Joseph J. Norton, Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial
Regulator Model Based on the United Kingdom FSA Experience—A Critical Reevaluation, 39 INT'L L. 15
(2005). Some might argue that the U.K.’s Twin Peaks approach came about from the need to dismantle the
FSA-approach, more than from its intrinsic qualities. See Michael W. Taylor, The Road from “Twin Peaks”—
And the Way Back, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 61 (2010).
34 Two recent prominent analyses of the suitability of a Twin Peaks regulatory structure concern Canada
and South Africa. Pan’s misnamed article essentially assesses the positive features of a financial sector
regulatory structure, looks at various regulatory structures, and decides on a Twin Peaks model for Canada.
See Eric Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 796 (2011).
The South African study basically cajoles the public into adopting a Twin Peaks approach. See SOUTH
AFRICA FIN. REGULATORY REFORM STEERING COMM., IMPLEMENTING A TWIN PEAKS MODEL OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2013), http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20%20Item%203%20Roadmap.pdf.
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Figure 2: Major Approaches to Financial Sector Regulation
Approach
Institutional
Approach
Functional
Approach

Integrated
Approach

Description
A firm’s legal status (for example a
bank, broker-dealer, or insurance
company) determines which regulator
oversees its activity.
The type of business conducted
determines which regulator oversees
that transaction. For example, a bank
selling securities and insurance products
may have three different regulators
overseeing its operations.
One single regulator oversees all
financial sector actors.

Country
Examples
China, Mexico,
Hong Kong
Brazil, France,
Italy, Spain.

Canada, Germany,
Japan, Qatar,
Singapore.

Twin Peaks
Approach

Separates regulators by objective –
Australia, UK,
such that one regulator oversees the
Netherlands
safety and soundness of the financial
(possibly South
system and the other focuses on the
Africa in the
conduct of business.
future?)
Source: summarized from Group of 30 (2008)35. The Country Examples may not
reflect changes made after 2008.
Twin Peaks financial regulation—and specifically such regulation based in
objectives-based legislation—provides an interesting development for scholars of
legislative drafting and jurisprudence for three reasons. First, most legislation
regulation does not “put it on the line” by defining specific objectives—and
therefore outcomes. Central banks often have had particular objectives (like
inflation control, encouraging economic growth and regulating banks).36 Securities
Supra note 30.
Congress only added the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank’s objectives to the 1913 Federal Reserve Act in
1977. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1913). That objective requires the Federal Reserve
to “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long
run potential to increase production.” Id. § 226. Banking regulation does not appear as a primary objective.
Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union appears to give the Central European
Bank regulatory authority to supervise banks almost as an after-thought, as “the [European] Council . . . may .
. . confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26/10/2012, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. Such a conferral requires a
35
36
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regulators also had specific objectives enshrined in legislation.37 However,
legislation—whether financial or otherwise—has rarely, if ever, explicitly stated
risks targeted and objectives of legislative action. Second, legislatively defined
objectives create objective yardsticks by which to measure executive agencies’
success. A specific objective allows independent analysts to assess versus
outcomes.38 Such a structure also focuses democratic accountability on executive
agencies for achieving these clearly-defined legislative objectives.39 Third, less
prescriptive legislation allows for less prescriptive regulation. In other words,
because legislation defines broad objectives (like financial stability), financial
regulators and other executive agencies can engage more freely in risk-based and
principles-based regulation.40 Principles-based regulation (as a system—including
the agency-level rules that focus on risk) clearly represent a new form of
governance.41
Despite its detractors, principles-based regulation—and the
objectives-based legislation that underpins such regulation—still represents one of
the best ways of dealing with complex social and economic problems.42 To the
extent that a country’s first objectives-based legislation represents a “framework
law,” that law clearly and unambiguously represents a completely different
approach to legislation.43 Legislation-by-objectives (even in the form of a financial
markets act) can create a precedent for future lawmaking-by-objectives.44
special legislative procedure, must be adopted unanimously, and must offer after consulting the European
Parliament and the European Central Bank itself. Id.
37 The original U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Act had a section titled Necessity for
Regulation. However, the section does not provide explicit objectives per se. The European Securities and
Markets Authority probably represents best-in-practice, having a clear statement of objectives to “protect the
public interest by contributing to the short, medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial
system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses.” See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (1934). The objective includes regulatory and supervisory objectives, objectives for ensuring the
integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial markets, proper regulation and
supervision of the taking of regulatory risks, and enhancing customer protection. Id.; see also Establishing a
European Supervisory Authority Regulation, OJ L 331 Reg. 1095/2010 (2010), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32010R1095.
38 Such a legislative approach in some ways enshrined the same principles that the U.K. introduced at the
regulatory level through its Citizens Charter policy. As a Prime Ministerial policy, the U.K.’s Citizens Charter
policy required U.K. public agencies to agree on service performance targets and report on these. See Bruce
Doern, The U.K. Citizen's Charter: Origins and Implementation in Three Agencies, 21 POL. & POLITICS 1
(1993). For the problems that the initiative encountered, see also Mary Bowerman, Auditing Performance
Indicators: The Role of the Audit Commission in the Citizen's Charter Initiative, 11 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY &
MGMT. 2 (1995).
39 For a discussion on the case of prudential regulation, see Julia Black, Managing Regulatory Risks and
Defining the Parameters of Blame: A Focus on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 28 L. &
POLICY 1 (2006).
40 Legislation which defines very specific obligations on regulators and financial institutions leaves very
little room for such regulators and institutions to develop their own methods of addressing the risk the statute
targets. See Cristie L. Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial
Crisis, MCGILL L. J. 55, (2010), http://works.bepress.com/cristie_ford/2/.
41 See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45
AMER. BUS. L. J. 1 (2008).
42 For a review of the issues (including the arguments against), see Julia Black, The Rise, Fall and Fate
of Principles Based Regulation, (LSE LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPER 17/2010, 2010),
http://works.bepress.com/cristie_ford/2/.
43 Scholars have recently described laws that change the way the legislature makes laws, “framework
laws.” Such framework laws impose obligations on future legislative members to pass laws in particular

Journal of Legislation

255

Yet, such objectives-based financial sector legislation and regulation is not
without its critics. Jones, for example, might argue that lawmakers should not
design financial regulators around financial market risks, institutions, and actors.45
To make the argument less abstract (and to paraphrase Jones to the breaking point),
the United States SEC should not just sit back and figure out how to apply rules to
JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, AIG, and other financial sector actors as they are. The
SEC, Federal Reserve, and other regulators should not react to financial markets.
They should shape them—requiring Goldman Sachs to break up, for example, at
their pleasure. Government should drive markets—not the other way around. Yet,
Von Nessen, almost as if responding to the Jonesian challenge, argues that
government diktat has caused large difficulties in the adoption of Australia’s Twin
Peaks legislation.46 Australian financial firms have had large difficulties accepting
and adapting their rules and compliance systems to Twin Peaks regulators
requirements down under. White warns that integrated regulatory approaches—like
Twin Peaks—provide financial regulators and central banks with too much
discretionary authority.47 For his part, Pan argues that the approach adopted for
financial sector regulation (and the organisational structure of financial regulators)
does not matter very much.48 Instead, the resources available and grant of legal
authorities to engage in effective regulation represents the most important part of
successful financial sector regulation. Even if regulatory approaches—like the
U.K.’s integrated model or its subsequent Twin Peaks model—represent the best
model for the U.K., nothing guarantees that such an approach will work when
exported.49
Yet, who could deny that Twin Peaks regulation based on objectives-centered
legislation (for better or worse) represents a new approach to lawmaking?
Proponents like Bakir mistakenly claim that Twin Peaks regulation serves as a way
of creating inter-agency collaboration through “steering and coordinating policy
networks . . . [and] governance through hierarchy in the financial services.”50 These
proponents argue that inter-agency collaboration still represents a challenge.51
formats. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation (USC Law School, USC Pub. Policy
Research Paper No. 04-3, 2004).
44 Why does most U.K. financial law focus so heavily on objectives, whereas other countries do not?
Some may argue in the U.K. that mental legislative entrenchment has affected such objectives-based thinking.
Once legislatures start thinking and using new concepts (like cost-benefit analysis, impact assessment,
objectives-based-legislation and so forth) later bills reflect these trends. See Oona Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV.
601 (2003).
45 See Renee Jones, Back to Basics: Why Financial Regulatory Overhaul is Overrated, 4
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 391 (2010).
46 See Paul Von Nessen, Financial Services Reform: What Can be Learned from the Australian
Experience, J. S. AFR. L. 64 (2006).
47 See Lawrence White, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?, 30 CATO J. 3 (2010).
48 See Eric Pan, Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, 55 VILL. L. REV. 743 (2010).
49 See Joseph J. Norton, Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial Regulator Model Based
on the United Kingdom FSA Experience—A Critical Reevaluation, 39 INT’L LAWYER 1 (2005).
50 Canir Bakir, The Governance of Financial Regulatory Reform: The Australian Experience, 87 PUB.
ADMIN. 4 (2009).
51 See Adriane Fresh and Martin Baily, What does international experience tell us about regulatory
consolidation? (Pew Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper 6, 2009),
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Other analysts put Twin Peaks regulation—sometimes with or sometimes without
objectives-based regulation—head-to-head with other regulatory models in a menu
fashion.52 Regardless of whether Twin Peaks regulation represents a new regulatory
model or not, objectives-based regulation does. Objectives-based legislation—and
the objectives-based regulation that give it force—represents a new way of thinking
about all kinds of legislation, not just in the financial sector.
II. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT TWIN PEAKS FINANCIAL REGULATION AND
THE OBJECTIVES-BASED LEGISLATION THAT PUTS IT IN PLACE?
A. TWIN PEAKS AS THE NEXT STEP OF REGULATORY INTEGRATION?
Financial regulators worldwide have struggled to find a regulatory structure
which fulfils the objectives of promoting financial stability and protecting
customers.53 Such a search has resulted in changes (sometimes several) to financial
sector regulatory structure since the 2000s. Figure 3 shows the number of
financially sophisticated countries who changed their financial regulatory structure
in the 2000s (and the number of changes).54 The impetus for financial sector
regulatory reform began well before the 2007-08 crisis—with regulators
recognizing that previous structures did not adequately generate macro and microprudential regulation nor protect customers adequately—while still encouraging
financial sector innovation and growth. Except for a jump in 2002, both the number
of countries adopting changes and the number of reforms, have remained relatively
constant throughout the decade. However, we cannot judge from this data the
extent to which these reforms focus on aligning regulations with particular
objectives.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCcQFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brookings.edu%2Fresearch%2Freports%2F2009%2F09%2F21-consolidationbaily&ei=pPxsU_iLNaiKywPKhoCoAw&usg=AFQjCNEvMCt2AuJfDpTRDZxe_d9iPlaIxg&bvm=bv.
52 Taylor represents one of the many authors who compares Twin Peaks side-by-side with other
approaches. To his unending credit, he represents one of the only authors to actually classify “regulation by
objective” as a separate system. See CHARLES TAYLOR, CHOOSING FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCY
MANDATES, PEW FIN. REF. PROJ. WORKING PAPER 6 (2009), https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2009/07/20/0013.pdf.
53 Financial sector regulators’ objective may vary from country to country, yet they all agree on the
basics of stable financial markets and protecting customers. For a fuller description of how various Twin
Peaks regulatory model objectives converge on these ultimate outcomes, see Jeroen Kremers and Dirk
Schoenmaker, Twin Peaks: Experiences in the Netherlands (LSE FIN. MKTS. GRP., WORKING PAPER 196,
2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/special-papers/SP196.pdf.
54 See Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Structure of Cross-Sector Financial Supervision, 17 FIN.
MKT., INST. & INSTRUMENTS 56, 58 (2008); Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn. Regulating the
Regulators: The Changing Face of Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Crisis, in
HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION AFTER THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS (2009).
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Figure 3: Countries Started Consolidating their Regulators
Even Before the Financial Crisis
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The figure show s the number of countries adopting changes in their financial regulatory architecture per year.
Sources: Herring and Carmassi (2008) for increase in the number of countries adopting a unified regulatory model
and Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) for data on number of reforms in supervisory architecture.

Yet, the trend toward integrating financial regulators suggests a regulatory
focus on objectives rather than financial institutions themselves. Figures 4a and 4b
show the nature of changes in financial sector regulation among a range of
countries.55 As shown in Figure 4a, sectoral supervision—the kind Hong Kong has
used—decreased dramatically over the decade from forty-five percent of the
countries Melecky and Podpiera studied—to thirty-four percent.56 Financial
legislation worldwide has integrated competencies for prudential supervision over
the decade—mostly with a central bank (or to a lesser extent, a financial services
authority). Integration of prudential supervisory functions in central banks, like
Hong Kong’s Monetary Authority, has not necessarily been the preferred method
for a variety of countries. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4b, the trend toward
integrating business (market) conduct competencies has also increased. Only a
handful of countries have adopted Twin Peaks style integration (assigning market
conduct to a separate agency). Yet, the trend toward looking at business conduct at
all has surged—from fifty percent of countries putting in place such a system of
oversight—to sixty-two percent by 2010.

55 Martin Melecky & Anca Podpiera, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION,
THEIR DRIVERS AND EMERGING BENCHMARK MODELS, at 33–-35 (MPRA, 2012), https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/37059/1/MPRA_paper_37059.pdf.
56 Hong Kong follows a functional approach in the Group of 30 and other academics’ taxonomy. Using
the Melecky and Podpiera taxonomy, Hong Kong employs a sectorally-based system of financial regulation.
While the words differ, the underlying concept remains the same. Hong Kong regulates financial institutions
according to their legal form and (to a limited extent) the services they provide.

258

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 46:2]

percent countries

Figure 4a: Integrated Macroprudential Regulators The Norm -- with Countries
Using Sectoral Supervisors on the Fall
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The figure show s organisational arrangements for the prudential supervision of financial institutions in a range of "high financial
depth" economies studied by the authors from 1999 to 2010. Please see the original source for the definitions of each type of
regulatory structure and criteria for assigning changes in prudential regulatory supervisory structures.
Source: Melecky and Podpiera (2012).
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Figure 4b: Integrated Business Conduct Regulatory Structures Continued
to Gain Popularity throughout the 2000s
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The figure show s organisational arrangements for the prudential supervision of financial institutions in a range of "high
financial depth" economies studied by the authors from 1999 to 2010. Please see the original source for the definitions of
each type of regulatory structure and criteria for assigning changes in prudential regulatory supervisory structures.
Source: Melecky and Podpiera (2012).

Unsurprisingly, integration among regulated entities has encouraged
integration of their regulators. A number of factors contribute to the benefits of
integration exceeding the costs among financial regulators, including: more crossborder financial transactions, economies of scale in regulation, computerization, and
conglomeration of financial organizations.57 Bureaucratic politics can also play an

57 Luna-Martinez and Rose provide one of the first thorough analyses of such factors. In their
comprehensive econometric study of factors influencing the extent of financial regulator integration, Melecky
and Podpiera find that GDP per capita, population trade-to-GDP ratios, central bank autonomy, number of
previous economic crises, stock market capitalization and private credit to deposit ratios have statistically
significant relationships with the integration of prudential supervision. Business conduct integration is
statistically significant in correlation to GDP per capita, trade-to-GDP ratios, credit-to-GDP ratios, and banks’
net interest margins. JOSE DE LUNA-MARTINEZ & THOMAS ROSE, FIN. SECTOR OPERATIONS AND POLICY
DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION (2003),
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6522027.pdf; MELECKY & PODPIERA, supra note 55.
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important role.58 Relative “bargaining power” between regulators and the regulated
can also play a role.59 Kremers and co-authors in particular have argued that the
presence of financial conglomerates in the Netherlands has militated for an
integrated regulatory structure.60 Figure 5 illustrates the forces encouraging the
integration of financial regulators and the need for objectives-based regulation. In
the U.S., acquisitions by financial firms outside of their sub-sector constituted about
eighteen percent of the value of all transactions. In the EU, such acquisitions (by
value) came to about twenty-five percent of all mergers and acquisitions between
1990 and 2006. Many financial service providers offer banking, insurance, and
securities simultaneously. In such a market environment, dividing regulators by
function makes less and less sense.
Figure 5: Increased Financial Integration Militates for Integrated
Regulators
Target
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The figure shows the value of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. and EU financial
services sectors from 1990-2006. Acquisitions outside of each sector came to about
18% for the U.S. and 25% for the EU.
Source: Herring and Carmassi (2008).61
What does the data say about the effectiveness of financial regulator
integration in achieving particular objectives like encouraging compliance with
macroprudential regulation and protecting customers? At first glance, such
integration produces mixed results (to say the least). Figure 6 provides some of the
first evidence about the effectiveness of regulator integration on compliance with
prudential and market conduct standards established by the International Monetary

58 See, e.g., Donato Masciandaro, Divide et Impera: Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank
Fragmentation Effect, 23 EURO. J. OF POL. ECON. 2 (2007).
59 See generally, Donato Masciandaro, Politicians and Financial Supervision Unification Outside the
Central Bank: Why Do They Do It?, 5 J. OF FIN. STABILITY. 2 (2009).
60 Jeroen Kremers et al., Cross-Sector Supervision: Which Model?, in.BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPER ON
FIN. SERV.: 2003, 225, 230-31 (2002).
61 Supra note 54.
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Fund (“IMF”).62 Integrated supervision has a statistically significant correlation
with compliance with Basel Core Principles.63 However, it doesn’t correlate with
much else. Instead, factors like overall regulatory environment and level of
economic development matter far more. Interestingly, the extent of integration does
not affect the number of regulatory staff monitoring financial institutions.
Figure 6: At First Glance, Data on Integrated Financial Supervision
Mixed at Best
Effect of Integrated
Supervision on...
Compliance with Basel
Core Principles

Effect?

Reason

Reference

Yes

A higher proportion of
countries with
integrated supervisors
had higher levels of
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Figure 3

Regulatory governance in
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No
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significant effect for
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Table 6

Prudential frameworks in
banking and securities
markets?

No

Same

Table 6

Regulatory PRACTICES in
banking and securities
markets?
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Same

Table 6
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safety nets in banking and
securities markets?

No

Same

Table 6

Compliance with
International Standards

No

Same

Table 7

Does the overall regulatory
environment matter?

Yes

Having an integrated
regulator matters far

Table 4

62 Martin Cihak & Richard Podpiera, IS ONE WATCHDOG BETTER THAN THREE? INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE WITH INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION, (IMF, 2006),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0657.pdf.
63 The Basel Core Principles represent advice promulgated to regulators in 2012, dealing with reducing
bank and banking system risk. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, (2012), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf.
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less for Basel Principle
compliance when
taking regulatory
environment into
account
Does level of economic
matter?

Yes

Having an integrated
regulator matters far
less for Basel Principle
compliance when
taking GDP per capita
into account

Table 4

Number of regulatory staff
in government

No

Regression analysis
shows no statistically
significant effect for
having an integrated
regulator.

Table 8

Source: Cihak and Podpiera (2006).
Some trends in the data suggest that regulator integration may lead to better
macro-prudential policymaking and market conduct. The data needs far more
analysis than the illustrative graphs we have put together. However, these
illustrative graphs (shown as Figures 7a and 7b) suggest that regulator integration
may help financial regulators achieve their objectives.64 Figure 7a shows a positive
relationship between integration of financial regulators and decreases in risk premia
associated with a country’s investments.65 Figure 7b shows a positive relationship
between integration of a country’s financial regulators and rule of law (as a possible
proxy for the extent to which financial firms engage in illegal activity).66 These
relationships do not control for macroeconomic factors or even control for potential
outliers. However, further analysis could confirm that integration among countries’
financial regulators has positive macro-prudential regulatory and market conduct
impacts—such results would provide support for further integration worldwide. A
64 The reader should see these graphs as only illustrative. We compared the organization of financial
sector supervision with the banking crises internationally. We found that countries which changed their
prudential supervision organizational structures had a forty-three percent average output loss as a result of
banking crises (with our results unadjusted for country size). In contrast, countries without any change in their
prudential supervisory structures had an unweighted output loss as a result of banking crisis of only thirty-two
percent. To repeat our analysis, see generally MARTIN MELECKY & ANCA PODPIERA, ORGANIZATION OF
FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION DATASET (2012); see also, LUC LAEVEN AND FABIAN VALENCIA, SYSTEMIC
BANKING CRISES DATABASE: AN UPDATE (IMF, 2012),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Systemic-Banking-Crises-Database-An-Update26015.
65 See Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, Inside and Outside the Central Bank:
Independence and Accountability in Financial Supervision, 24 EURO. J. POL. ECON. 4 (2008). WORLD BANK,
DATABANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RISK?end=2014&start=1960&view=chart.
66See WORLD BANK, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (2014),
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. For Masciandaro and co-authors, see supra note 65.
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Twin Peaks regulatory structure would certainly represent one of the more
integrated regulatory models considered by lawmakers in these countries.

integration of
financial regulators

Figure 7a: Countries with Integrated Regulators Have Lower Risk Premia -- Suggesting
Better Macroprudential Policies
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The figure show s the relationship betw een the degree of integration of financial regulators compared w ith risk premia
in various countries' financial markets (compared w ith the local lending rates minus T-bill rates) in a range of countries.
Level of economic development does not cause omitted variable bias in this figure. See original for definition of
concentration of financial regulators.
Sources: Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) for data on financial regulator concentration and World Bank (2014) for
data on risk premia.
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Figure 7b: Integrated Regulators Promote Better Market Conduct?
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The figure show s the relationship betw een the degree of integration of financial regulators compared w ith rule of law
scores (as one of the World Bank's Worldw ide Governance Indicators) in a range of countries. The level of economic
development does not cause omitted variable bias in this figure. See originals for definitions of concentration of
financial regulators and rule of law . The extent to w hich rule of law proxies market misconduct is very much an open
question.
Sources: Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) for data on financial regulator concentration and World Bank (2014) for
data on rule of law .

Financial regulator integration also seems to improve these regulators’
independence and accountability—making them more likely to achieve their
objectives. Figure 8 shows the change in scores of financial regulators’
independence and accountability after a change in regulatory structure.67 Bird—
talking specifically about the accountability of Australia’s Twin Peaks regulators—
67 See MARC QUINTYN et al., THE FEAR OF FREEDOM: POLITICIANS AND THE INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISORS 42 (IMF, 2007),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Fear-of-Freedom-Politicians-and-theIndependence-and-Accountability-of-Financial-Sector-20155.
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change in regulatory
accountability after reform

finds the accountability arrangements covering the country’s Prudential Regulatory
Authority and Securities and Investments Commission adequate.68 Masciandaro
and co-authors find this effect increases when the prudential regulator sits outside of
the central bank.69 Integration, particularly outside the central bank, correlates with
greater financial stability (namely fewer systemic banking crises).70

60

Figure 8: Financial Sector Regulators World-Wide More Independent and
Accountable After Reform
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The figure show s the extent to w hich accountability and independence of various countries' financial regulators changes
after financial regulatory reform expressed as a percent of a benchmark given by the authors -- according to survey data.
Countries like Turkey and Mexico improved the most. Japan and Estonia backpeddled.
Source: Quintyn and co-authors (2007)

Many authors have reviewed the pros and cons of using a principles-based
financial sector regulatory approach as opposed to a rules-based financial sector
regulatory approach.71 These authors miss the point. Legislators should not simply
balance pros and cons of principles versus rules from a priori principles. Instead,
they should match regulatory structure to regulatory environment. In other terms,
structure should follow strategy.72 Melecky and Podpiera, among others, find a
strong relationship between the structure of financial sector regulators and various
macroeconomic and financial sector variables. As we have previously mentioned,
some of these factors include GDP per capita, population trade-to-GDP ratios,
68 Joanna Bird, Regulating the Regulators: Accountability of Australian Regulators, 35 MELB. U.L. REV.
739, 755 (2011).
69 Such a finding holds particular relevance for jurisdictions like Hong Kong, where the central bank has
always played a pivotal and undisputed role in establishing macro-prudential regulations. See Donato
Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, Inside and Outside the Central Bank: Independence and
Accountability in Financial Supervision, 24 EURO. J. POL. ECON. 4 (2008).
70 See generally BARRY EICHENGREEN & NERGIZ DINCER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WHO
SHOULD SUPERVISE? THE STRUCTURE OF BANK SUPERVISION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (2011), https://www.nber.org/papers/w17401.
71 For a recent description in the financial regulation context, see John Coffee & Hillary Sale,
Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009); see also Richard
Abrams & Michael Taylor, ISSUES IN THE UNIFICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION (IMF, 2000).
72 The question about whether public sector organizational design adapts to the broader organizational
environment remains an open one. For an empirical analysis of the extent to which government agency size
and specialization (structure) responds to the macroeconomic environment, see BRYANE MICHAEL & MAJA
POPOV, PUB. ORG. REVIEW, THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1740842.
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extent of central bank autonomy, number of previous banking crises, stock market
capitalization, credit-to-GDP ratios, and banks’ net interest margins.73 The question
isn’t whether countries like Hong Kong should have a sectoral basis of financial
regulation as opposed to a Twin Peaks one. Instead, countries like Hong Kong
should choose the regulatory approach most appropriate for their financial markets
(as measured by a range of macroeconomic and other variables).
As the economic crisis already illustrated, some countries’ lawmakers can
make incorrect decisions about the structure of the country’s financial regulators.
Figures 9a and 9b show the extent of the over or under integration of several
countries’ financial regulators.74 Some prudential regulators—like the U.K.’s and
Korea’s—have over-integrated (compared with other countries with similar levels
of GDP-per-capita and other factors). Other countries’ prudential regulators—like
Hong Kong’s, Canada’s, and Mexico’s—have under-integrated.
Similarly,
regulators focusing on financial sector business conduct have over-integrated in
Singapore and Germany. Such regulators have under-integrated in Hong Kong and
Switzerland.

See Melecky, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
The authors ran regression analysis on the extent of financial sector regulatory integration and a range
of variables for most of the world’s economies. Such regression would show which countries have higher (or
lower) levels of regulator integration compared with other countries that have similar levels of GDP-per-capita
and other factors. Any judgment about over or under integration would thus assume that the average or
normal level of integration for any chosen level of GDP-per-capita (and other factors) represents the right
level. Naturally, such value judgments should be taken with scepticism. For figures’ source, see supra note
55.
73
74
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Figure 9b: Hong Kong's Financial Sector Regulators Monitoring Business
Conduct Also Under-Integrated
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The figure show s the degree of over-integration of each country's BUSINESS CONDUCT financial regulators - as
predicted by a range of factors w hich should determine the optimal extent of regulator integration. We subtracted actual
integration scores w ith fitted values (predicted by regression analysis) and assumed that differences betw een actuals
and predicted scores represent over-regulator (if the resulting difference is positive) or under-regulation (if the regulating
difference is negative).
Source: Melecky and Podpiera (2012)

Financial sector regulatory integration does not need to correlate with
objectives-based financial legislation. However, the two trends have coincided over
the years. Larger financial regulators need to define objectives (outcomes) rather
than specific activities to regulate. Regulator size provides economies of scope and
scale in overseeing a range of financial sector activities.75 Larger financial sector
risks have also militated a focus on specific types of risks—rather than simply
focusing on processes of regulated entities. With increasing leverage, larger sizes,
and more international exposure, financial entities pose systemic risks unknown
even twenty years ago.76 Thus, larger and more integrated financial regulators
would usually do well to focus on objectives.
B. LEGISLATING TWIN PEAKS REGULATORY STRUCTURES THROUGH
OBJECTIVES-BASED LEGISLATION
A number of jurisdictions have adopted a twin-peaks regulatory structure (or
other similar structure). In the U.K., a review of regulators’ response to the
financial crisis has led the Government to adopt a Twin Peaks structure.77
According to recent surveys, “79% of firms believe the changes to the regulatory
See Abrams, supra note 71.
We do not have space to describe these risks in this paper. Interestingly, authors like Allen and Gale
note that inappropriate financial regulation may have actually contributed to systemic and other risks (like
counterparty risks). See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Systemic Risk and Regulation, THE RISKS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 341 (University of Chicago Press, 2007).
77 See Alison Lui, Single or Twin? The UK Financial Regulatory Landscape After the Financial Crisis of
2007–2009, 13 J. OF BANK. REG. 24 (2012).
75
76
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system will result in improved effectiveness, which can be expected to contribute to
promoting the UK as a global hub for the financial sector.”78 Regarding Australia’s
twin peaks system, Professor Brown echoes the many voices in the literature that
have argued that Australia’s twin peaks regulatory model helped it during the
crisis.79 “The evidence from this examination suggests that Australia was able to
avoid many of the problems that arose in the United States and the United Kingdom
… partly due to its twin peaks regulatory structure.”80 The Dutch experience with
Twin Peaks regulation shows that such a regulatory structure helped the Netherlands
weather the global financial crisis.81 South Africa’s consultation on its upcoming
Twin Peaks reforms also points to the promise of such regulation.82 Given its
promise, the EU is considering adopting a twin-peaks approach in its Union-wide
surveillance and monitoring actions.83 As previously mentioned, the US Treasury
and General Accountability Office have already come out in favour of an
objectives-based Twin Peaks approach for the USA.84
A Twin Peaks approach to financial sector regulation does not strictly require
objectives-based legislation. Indeed, the legislation setting up Australia’s Twin
Peaks approach to financial sector regulation focuses on setting up the organizations
sitting on each of the Peaks and defining their activities. The Australian 1998
Prudential Regulation Authority Act provides no objectives at all.85 The Act notes
that “the [Australian Prudential Regulation Authority] exists . . . [for] regulating
bodies in the financial sector in accordance with other laws of the Commonwealth
that provide for prudential regulation or for retirement income standards,
78 Michelle Carrol & Michael McKee, BDO & DLA PIPER, THE NEW TWIN PEAKS MODEL 8 (2012),
https://www.bdo.co.uk/getattachment/bb4e11fe-2767-40b2-b548-cfed3f40a4ee/attachment.aspx.
79 See Elizabeth Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 509 (2010).
80 Elizabeth Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 509 (2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1864898.
81 Like with all regulatory approaches, the Netherlands’s Twin Peaks model had good as well as bad
aspects. For an illuminating discussion of the Dutch experience (and succinct recommendations for improving
the Dutch version), see MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKT. DEP’T., TECHNICAL NOTE ON FINANCIAL SECTOR
SUPERVISION: THE TWIN PEAKS MODEL, (IMF, 2011),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11208.pdf.
82 The Financial Sector Regulation Bill looks a lot like the UK’s implementing legislation—with a focus
on objectives. See NAT’L TREASURY, FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION BILL (2013),
http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20%20Item%201%20Financial%20Sector%20Regulation%20Bill.pdf.
83 The EU currently follows a sectoral approach for Union-wide surveillance. However, several
politicians and senior advisors have started militating for a Twin Peaks approach. For an overview of the EU
system of financial regulation, see Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About
Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 2,
(2007). For one example of a senior EU legislator arguing for a Twin Peaks approach, see Pervenche Beres,
First Step Towards 'Twin Peaks' Model of Financial Supervision, BANKING TODAY, Mar.–Apr. 2014,
https://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/step-twin-peaks-model-financial-analysis-496770.
84 We have previously discussed Treasury’s Blueprint. Interestingly, the GAO was looking at reform of
the U.S. financial regulatory structure well before the global crisis. See GAO, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2004),
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-61.
85 See Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 No. 50 (1998),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014C00106/Html/Text#_Toc381004899.
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administering the financial claims schemes . . . and developing the administrative
practices and procedures to be applied in performing that regulatory role and
administration.”86 This is hardly an inspiring vision statement for the Authority.
The Act contains what looks like an objectives-based requirement to “balance the
objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, contestability and
competitive neutrality and, in balancing these objectives, . . . promote financial
system stability in Australia.”87 Yet, the existence of these abstract and multiple
regulatory objectives would make derived rulemaking (based on article 8(2))
extremely difficult. In other words, one could hardly imagine the Authority
promulgating a rule about the central clearance of derivative transactions based on
the authority of the singular and concrete mandate derived from article 8(2). Yet, if
we must point to one article in the Act as the objectives-based legislative mandate
for the Authority’s function, article 8(2) of the Prudential Regulation Authority Act
would provide the natural candidate.88
The UK’s Financial Services Act could not provide a starker contrast to the
way legislation defines objectives, rather than organizations and their processes.
Figure 10 shows the objectives defined in various parts of the UK 2009 Banking
Act.89 Objectives appear scattered across various parts of the Act. In the case of
special resolution regimes, the Act outlines the objectives—leaving the Treasury to
issue a Code of Practice.90 In the case of bank insolvency, the Act provides
liquidators with general powers, which they use to achieve their objectives.91 With
regard to bank administration, the Act makes plain that “a bank administrator may
do anything necessary or expedient for the pursuit of the Objectives.”92
Figure 10: The UK’s Legislative Design of Objectives-Based Twin Peaks
Regulatory Structure: The Financial Conduct Authority
Part I: Special Resolution
Regime

Objectives and Code

4. Special
Objectives

Resolution

The Act provides the UK’s Treasury, Financial Services Authority, and Bank of
England with stabilisation powers, use of bank insolvency procedures, or bank
administration procedures to (in no particular order):
• Protect and enhance the stability of the UK’s financial systems (objective 1)
• Protect and enhance public confidence in the stability of the banking systems of
the United Kingdom (objective 2)
Id. at 8(1) (alteration in original).
Id. at 8(2).
88 We could have done the same analysis for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act.
In order to keep our paper at a readable length, we will focus our discussion mostly on prudential regulatory
legislative provisions rather than business conduct ones. See Australian Securities and Investments
Commission Act 2001 No. 51 (2001), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2013C00002.
89 See Banking Act c.1 (2009), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/contents.
90 Id. at 5.
91 Id. at 75–76.
92 Id. at 108.
86
87
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• Protect depositors (objective 3)
• Protect public funds (objective 4) and
• Avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of a Human Rights Act
convention right (objective 5).
The order in which the objectives are listed in this section is not significant; they are
to be balanced as appropriate in each case.
Part
II:
Bank
Process of Bank
99. Objectives
Insolvency
Liquidation
Bank liquidators should pursue two objectives (with objective 1 taking precedence
over objective 2):
• Work with the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to ensure that eligible
depositors either have their accounts moved to another financial institution or
receive payment from the Scheme (objective 1)
• Wind up the bank’s affairs for the greatest benefit of the bank's creditors
(objective 2).
Part
3
Bank
Introduction
137-140. Objectives
Administration
The Act provides bank administrators with two objectives (with the first
objective taking priority),
• Provide support for commercial purchaser or bridge bank (objective 1), and
• Provide “normal” administration (objective 2).
If the purchaser or “normal” administration is no longer required, these
objectives cease to exist.
Part 5 Inter-Bank
Regulation
188. Principles
Payment Systems
The Bank of England may publish–after receiving the Treasury’s okay–any
principles it deems appropriate.
The figure provides a plain English explanation of the legislation, omitting
original formatting. See original for exact measures and specific language.
Source: UK 2009 Banking Act
The organic provisions governing the UK’s Twin Peaks regulators also revolve
around defining objectives—leaving the new organizations to define their own
rules. Figure 11 shows an example of legislation creating the UK’s Financial
Conduct Authority (though we could have presented the Prudential Regulatory
Authority without any change in the tenor of our analysis).93 As shown, the Act
outlines three objectives (sections 1C-1E). The Act further devolves rulemaking
authority to the Financial Conduct Authority (in section 1K). Rather than defining
the Authority’s powers and processes in a detailed manner, the Act authorizes a
93 See Financial Services Act 2012 c.21, Part 2, at 6 (amending sections 1 to 18 of the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 as part 1A Chapter 1),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/part/2/crossheading/financial-conduct-authority-and-prudentialregulation-authority/enacted.
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number of panels to oversee the Authority’s work (sections 1N-1Q). The Act thus
uses ex-post evaluation—rather than ex-ante rulemaking—as the main way of
regulating the regulator.
Figure 11: The UK’s Legislative Design of Objectives-Based Twin Peaks
Regulatory Structure: The Financial Conduct Authority
Provision
Overview
1. defines overall objective “ensuring that the relevant
markets function well”
2. provides requirement to uphold the “strategic objectives”
defined in the Act
3. gives authority to engage in rulemaking needed to ensure
fulfilment of objective

Location
1B

Consumer Protection Objective
Defines an 8 part list of principles which the Authority
should keep in mind when regulating)
Integrity Objective
Defines 5 part inclusive list of characteristics defining
integrity of the “UK financial system”
Competition Objective
sets out a 5 part criteria for assessing “effective competition
in the interests of “financial consumers”
Definitions which define Authority’s jurisdiction
Power to Amend Objectives
Treasury may amend
Rulemaking authority
Duty to engage in supervision
Duty to Consult
Authority Oversight
Defines a group of panels that oversee the Authority’s work
Right to Conduct Market Review
Authority to Obtain Documents Needed for Reviews

1C
1D
1E

1F-1I
1J
1K
1L
1M
1N-Q
1S
1T

The figure provides a paraphrasing of the provisions of the relevant sections of the
2012 Financial Services Act (Part 2 amending the Financial Services and Markets
Act of 2000). The reader should consult the original text for authoritative text.
Objectives-based legislation thus sets general objectives (tied to risks) and
allows regulators to adopt rules which achieve those objectives.94 As if to belabour
94 Omarova and Feibelman represent perhaps some of the most avid proponents of designing a financial
sector regulatory structure around objectives. At the risk of over-interpreting their proposal, they suggest
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the point, Figure 12 summarizes our presentation of several pieces of the UK’s
objectives-based financial sector legislation in graphical form. The legislation
focuses on risks identified by regulators and the public during the legislative
process.95 Besides initial identification of risks by government agencies, like
Treasury, business and civil society groups have their say on the risks and
objectives targeted by the Twin Peaks legislation.96 In the Banking Act, various
policy areas have their own objectives (defined in different parts of the Act). In the
case of the Financial Services Act, the section outlining the Financial Conduct
Authority places all the objectives up front. In each case, the relevant executive (or
public sector) agencies charged with obtaining the objectives receive authority to
engage in delegated legislation. As we will see in the upcoming sections,
administrative agencies often further devolve rulemaking—in the form of risk-based
or principles-based regulation—on financial institutions directly.
Figure 12: A Schematic Depiction of the UK’s Objectives-Based Financial Regulation
UK’s Banking Act

UK’s Financial Services Act of 2012

risk
risk of undermined confidence, financial
(objective) sector instability, fraud against
customers, and financial crime.

risk
(objective)

risk of fraud, anti-competitive
behaviour and other crimes

Inter-Bank Payment
Systems

Bank Administration

Bank Insolvency

Issue
Specific
Objectives

Special Resolution
Regime

from FSMA

devolved competencies
to make rules
Specific application
as required

structure
of Act

overaching legislative
objective
subsidiary objectives
- principles, tests and
list-based definitions
authority to regulate

ex-post
control

“tweaks”
by Treasury
as needed

oversight
by Panels

principles-based guidelines and
other regulatoryinstruments
risk-based internal compliance
rules and controls

starting from a clean slate–first deciding on regulatory objectives and then designing regulatory agencies
around those objectives. See Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for
Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881 (2009).
95 Some of these can be seen in preliminary documents leading up to the passage of the Financial
Services Act. See UK TREASURY, TREASURY - TWENTY-SIXTH REPORT, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY
(2012), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1574/157402.htm. See also
TREASURY, TREASURY - TWENTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: REPORT ON THE
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2012),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1857/185702.htm.
96 In the case of the establishment of the Financial Conduct Authority, the House of Commons heard
testimony from almost seventy persons and organizations–including names like the City of London
Corporation, AXA UK, Financial Services Practitioner Panel, Aviva, and others.
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One attraction of objectives-based legislation lay in the ability to devolve
responsibility for achieving the objectives to industry in the form of principlesbased regulation.97 Objectives-based legislation would obviously provide the
objectives for use in principles-based regulation.98 Figure 13 shows how objectives
(as enshrined in the UK’s principles-based regulation) translate into outcomes—and
how financial institutions—like Lloyds Banking Group (“Lloyds”)—translate these
outcomes into their own principles.99 In this particular example, the Financial
Services Authority’s Business Principles led to the publication of a guidance
document for use by UK financial institutions.100 This provides further guidance for
the general objectives set out by the regulator. Each financial institution responds to
the regulators’ objectives and principles in their own internal policies. We show the
five “pillars” (or objectives) that Lloyds used to translate national regulatory
objectives into its own specific objectives (and specific policies, which we do not
show in the figure).101 Objectives “cascade” from national regulator to financial
institution.

97 Authors like Ford have argued principles-based regulation represents a new governance paradigm.
Indeed, objectives-based legislation may represent the same new governance paradigm at the legislative level
that principles-based regulation provides at the rulemaking level. See Cristie Ford, New Governance,
Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2008),
http://www.cccucuta.org.co/uploads_descarga/desc_725679340f90dc19a918613be1317850.pdf.
98 Professor Di Lorenzo argues that regulations must have “legislative congruence” in order to comply
with the statute’s dictates while achieving the objectives that legislators sought in the first place. Naturally,
any system that just “passes on” objectives from legislators’ podiums to regulators desks (or directly passes
objectives from the statute to the rulebook) achieves such congruence more efficiently. See Vincent Di
Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 45
(2012).
99 Unsurprisingly, the simple illustration we provide grossly simplifies the way regulations (and
particularly principles-based regulations) promulgate through the financial system. Black discusses the
various channels used while Cunningham even questions the use of the term “principles-based” as a valid
description. See Julia Black, The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation, LSE LEG. STUD.
WORKING PAPERS 17/2010 (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1712862; Lawrence
Cunningham, Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principles-Based Systems in Corporate Law, Securities
Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1409 (2007).
100 See FSA, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007),
https://www.fca.org.uk/old-fsa-website; FSA, TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY – TOWARDS FAIR OUTCOMES
FOR CONSUMERS (2006), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/archive/fsa-tcf-towards.pdf. We refer to FSA
rulemaking, as the Financial Services Authority did not just disappear overnight when the UK’s Twin Peaks
regulators appeared.
101 See Lloyds Banking Group, Code of Personal Responsibility (2013),
https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/our-group/responsibility/policies-andcodes/code_of_personal_responsibility.pdf.
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Figure 13: From Principal to Outcome in the
Defunct Financial Services Authority Regulatory Regime
FSA’s Eleven Commandments
Act with integrity
Act with due skill, care and diligence
Organise and control affairs responsibly,
wtih adequate risk management
Maintain adequate financial resources
Observe proper standards of market conduct
Treat customers fairly
Communicate clearly and honestly with clients
Lloyds Five Pillars
1. Put customers at the heart of business.
2. Be a great company to work for
3. Work responsibly with external stakeholders.
4. Invest in communities
5. Reduce environmental impact.

Manage conflicts of interest fairly
Ensure suitability of advice
Protect clients’ assets
Co-operate with regulators
Outcome 1: Fair treatment central to bank’s corporate culture.
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed actually meet
customers’ needs
Outcome 3: Consumers given clear information before, during
and after sale.
Outcome 4: Consumers receive suitable advice
Outcome 5: Consumers given expected level of
performance/quality.
Outcome 6: Consumers do not experience extreme switching
costs or costs to complain

Source: paraphrased from FSA (2007), FSA (2006) and Lloyds Banking Group (2013).

Principles-based financial sector regulator has its proponents and detractors.
Many authors note that principles-based regulation (if supported better by
regulatory enforcement) could have mitigated some of the worst parts of the 2007–
08 crisis. Ford, in her analysis of the UK’s principles-based regulation, argues that
inadequate enforcement—rather than the nature of principles-based regulation in
itself—led to inadequate regulator responses to the crisis.102 Yet others note that the
UK’s controversial experience with principles-based financial sector regulation
provides some lessons for other countries—like Hong Kong. The biggest criticism
of principles-based regulation comes from the uncertain responses companies had in
implementing the new rules.103 An equally valid critique has been that principlesbased regulation has coincided with “light touch” regulation.104 To sum up the
prevailing view from the literature, principles-based regulation thus trades
regulatory simplicity for decreased certainty about what the regulator will accept
ex-post as financial institutions’ response to regulation.105
102 Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis,
MCGILL L. J. 55 (2010), https://works.bepress.com/cristie_ford/2/.
103 Authors like Conceicao and Gray warned that companies might have difficulty drafting internal rules
based on abstract principles. They were right. See Carlos Conceicao and Rosalind Gray, Problems of
Uncertainty - The FSA Cannot Underestimate the Risk of Fewer Rules Creating More Fear and Less
Innovation, 26 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 42 (2007).
104 See Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAP. MAR. L. J. 4 (2008).
For the media’s analysis of the confusion between principled-based and light-touch regulation, see Harry
Wilson, Hector Sants Calls Time on FSA's 'Light Touch' Regulation, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 12, 2010),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7431645/Hector-Sants-calls-time-onFSAs-light-touch-regulation.html.
105 To continue with our example from Lloyds Banking Group, the recent fines for treating customers
unfairly shows how banks can see and implement regulators’ controls, but misjudge whether they have reacted
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The literature suggests two things about the way that objectives-based financial
sector legislation would translate into regulations and thus financial institutions’
internal policies. First, objectives-based legislation—and attendant principles-based
regulation—could allow for a greater regulatory focus on risks. Clearly, more and
tighter regulations should govern areas of financial sector activity with higher
risks—leaving less risky areas relatively under-regulated.106 By focusing on
objectives rather than on processes, financial institutions can spend more time and
energy drafting complex internal regulations controlling complex risks—leaving
less risky areas with fewer (lighter) rules. Second, such policies would shift
competencies for financial section regulation directly onto financial institutions—
increasing costs as well as risks.107 Allowing banks and broker-dealers to regulate
themselves (self-regulation) seems counterproductive. However, as shown in
Figure 14, the cost and benefits of such an approach will depend on a number of
variables. Depending on the values of the variables described in the figure, either a
rules-based or principles-based approach will work better. The best system depends
on the country in question.
Figure 14: Factors affecting whether an objectives-based financial sector
legislation and regulation would outperform a rules-based approach
variable
way variable affects objectives-based legislation
Number of
As the number of regulators rises, their cost increases,
government
making the country’s regulatory regime more expensive.
regulators needed
Moreover, the taxes raised to pay their salaries may reduce
financial sector and overall economic growth.
Relative efficiency of
government versus
Nothing requires regulators to have superior abilities
banks’ legal
to draft regulations based on legislation and analyse
departments and
regulatory impacts better than in-house counsel and
economics
economists. Bank-based analysts (if they have long timedepartment staff
horizons) have stronger personal financial incentives to
strike the right balance between prudence and profit.
correctly. Lloyds put in place incentive schemes designed to increase sales which the FCA thought, “led to a
serious risk that sales staff were put under pressure to hit targets to get a bonus or avoid being demoted, rather
than focus on what consumers may need or want.” See FCA, FCA Fines Lloyds Banking Group Firms a Total
of £28,038,800 for Serious Sales Incentive Failings (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/pressreleases/fca-fines-lloyds-banking-group-firms-total-£28038800-serious-sales-incentive.
106 For a review of the promises of risk-based regulation (and a review from several jurisdictions), see
Julia Black, The Development of Risk Based Regulation in Financial Services: Canada, the UK and
Australia (2004), http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff publications full text/black/risk based regulation in
financial services.pdf.
107 Regulators using financial institutions to regulate for them represents a way to leverage public
resources—which in the private sector context is called “leveraging off the client.” Authors like Omarova see
strong incentives for financial firms to create optimal self-regulation that minimises systemic risks. See Saule
Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
411 (2011). Authors like Helm are not convinced. See Dieter Helm, Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the
Regulatory Burden, 22 OXF. REV. ECON. POL. 2 (2013).
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Cooperation
between compliance
departments

Cooperation—through a national banking association
for example—can ensure financial institutions’ in-house
counsel and economists do not create institution-specific
rules from scratch. By communicating, they can agree on
fundamental provisions in all financial institutions’
policies. Naturally, free-riding and collective action
problems may make the costs of such cooperation exceed
the benefits.

Relative asymmetry
of shocks between
financial institutions

To the extent that financial institutions require
differing responses to shocks (for example one bank will
suffer more than others from a change in interest rates),
delegated rule-making may allow them to better tailor a
response.

Reduction in profits
from rules

McKinsey estimates that return on equity from banks
will fall from 20% to 7% due to lower profits and
quantities traded from new financial sector regulations.108
The more firms can tailor their own rules, the less this
damage from excess rulemaking.

Marginal change in
financial
institutions’ staff
time dealing with
compliance rather
than policy writing

Financial institutions will need to adjust their
policies, no matter which regulatory approach used. If
these institutions need about the same amount of time to
create substantive rules as to simple adopt policies to
comply with prescriptive rules, then companies should just
write these substantive rules for themselves.

Relative
effectiveness of selfwritten rules on
reducing the
probability of
financial distress

The benefits of regulator-written rules versus industry
(or company) written rules depends on whose rules
provide better protection against systemic and other risks
(while offering the possibility of profit). If financial
institutions write better rules, then clearly they should have
self-regulatory powers.

Relative monitoring
and punishment
costs under
principles-based vs.
rules-based regime

Rules control risks only if financial institutions follow
them. If financial institutions can ignore regulators’ rules
(due to low detection probabilities or penalties), selfregulation of a principles-based system could provide
superior results.

108 Markus Böhme, et al., Day of Reckoning? New Regulation and its Impact on Capital-markets
Businesses, MCKINSEY WORKING PAPERS ON RISK, NUMBER 29 (2011),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/Risk/Working%20papers/29_Day_of_re
ckoning.ashx.
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The figure shows the factors that would determine whether the costs and benefits of
a government regulator promulgating specific financial sector rules would exceed
those of a decentralized approach (with firms deciding specific policies that comply
with general objectives). We do not show the actual equation(s) in order to keep the
paper readable for a general audience. We do not show concrete results (using
simulation or regression analysis) due to lack of data. We assume that government
regulators and professionals working in financial firms earn the same salaries.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we argued that objectives-based legislation may help solve some
difficult executive agency organizational problems which have stumped legal,
public administration, and economics scholars. Objectives-based regulation could
change the way lawmakers and regulators see the role of law in implementing
government policies. When tackling complex risks (like security or financial
stability), lawmakers passed a range of legislation with competencies and
obligations assigned to a range of government agencies. Recent legal scholarship
around the objectives-based Twin Peaks financial regulation challenges the usual
view of legislating. Such legislating sets out social (financial) risks, defines
particular statutory objectives and creates executive agencies to achieve those
objectives. Such an approach promises to reduce the complex and sometimes
ineffective inter-agency collaborations which bedevil public administration.

